Changing Patterns of Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa : Analysis of UCDP/PRIO Dataset from the 1960s to the 2000s by 岡野, 英之
Changing Patterns of Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa（OKANO）2016】 1© Institute of International Relation and Area Studies, Ritsumeikan University
Abstract
This article elucidates trends of civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa 
(thereafter ‘Africa’) from the 1960s to the 2000s. For this purpose, 
this article uses the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The 
UCDP/PRIO dataset provides a numerical definition of ‘armed 
conflict.’ This definition enables an objective selection of cases. 
From the cases selected from the UCDP/PRIO, I uncover trends of 
the civil wars in Africa. First, majority of civil wars in the 1990s 
were newly broken. Among countries that experienced civil wars in 
the decade, more than half countries had not been involved in civil 
war before (if they were, not intense), while the rest of the countries 
faced with continuations of armed conflicts from the 1960s. This 
tells that the 1990s are the decade in which more new armed con-
flicts broke out than other decades. Second, the civil wars in the 
1990s have a precursor. Coups erupted in several countries in the 
1980s. Most of the countries that experienced the coups were not 
involved in civil wars in the following decade. The probable reason 
is that the coups provided an opportunity for national reforms, 
while countries that experienced civil wars in the 1990s missed the 
chances. Third, the larger part of new civil wars in the 1990s broke 
out not only because of domestic factors, but also because of influ-
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which armed conflicts of respective countries affected each other.
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INTRODUCTION
This article aims to capture the long-term trends of civil wars in sub-Saha-
ran Africa from the 1960s to the 2000s1)(Theafter, I use Afica and sub Sa-
haran Afica intercharchably). The examined period starts from 1960 be-
cause the majority of countries in Africa achieved independence from 1960 
on. In Africa, civil wars pauselessly persist somewhere since 1960. This ar-
ticle analyzes the trends of African civil wars until 2009. 
Majority of studies on civil wars in Afica have focused on the 1990s. The 
civil wars in this decade were perceived to be unprecedented in scale as 
well as in number. Several countries lost their central governments be-
cause of civil wars such as Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda. The impact of 
the 1990s was so strong that the majority of studies on the African civil 
wars have solely examined the 1990s (cf. Allen 1999; Kaldor 1999; 
Takeuchi 2007; Zartman 1995).
A recent study tells that the trend from the 1990s transformed since the 
mid-2000s. According to Strauss, new patterns of civil wars have emerged 
in Africa since the late 2000s (Straus 2012). Since the trend of the 1990s 
has begun to change, it is a good opportunity to reconsider and relativize 
the civil wars of the 1990s. How have the trends of the African civil wars 
changed from the 1960s to the 2000s? How do the civil wars in the 1990s 
relate to civil wars of the other decades? Do the civil wars in the 1990s and 
the civil wars in the other period have the same causes? This article tack-
les these questions by elucidating the overlapping trends of the African 
 1) In this article, I refer to ‘Africa’ and ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ interchangeably. This article fo-
cuses on countries of Sub-Sahara Africa. North Africa is not in focus.
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civil wars from the 1960s to the 2000s. In order to avoid overlooking minor 
trends, this article analyzes a quantitative dataset of armed conflict 
through qualitative manners. The dataset used in this article is from the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, which has been popular among 
scholars of armed conflicts2). 
Note that this article only deals with civil wars in independent countries 
in Africa. Colonial wars are not discussed in this article. 
The findings of this article are as follows. First, majority of the civil wars 
in the 1990s were newly broken. Among countries that experienced civil 
wars in the decade, more than half countries had not been involved in 
warfare before the decade (if they were, not intense), while the rest of the 
countries faced with continuations of armed conflicts from the 1960s. This 
tells that the 1990s are the decade in which more new armed conflicts 
broke out than other decades but, it does not means that most of the wars 
are newly broken. Second, the civil wars in the 1990s have a precursor. 
Coups erupted in several countries in the 1980s. Most of the countries that 
experienced the coups were not involved in civil wars in the following dec-
ade. The probable reason is that the coups provided an opportunity for na-
tional reforms, while countries that experienced civil wars in the 1990s 
missed the chances. Third, the larger part of new civil wars in the 1990s 
broke out not only because of domestic factors, but also because of influ-
ence from neighboring countries. Several zones were observable, in which 
armed conflicts of respective countries affected each other.       
Causes of the African civil wars in the 1990s
Discussion begins with examining the civil wars in the 1990s. During the 
1990s, Africa experienced rampant rises of civil wars. Due to the impact, 
scholars have attempted to understand the mechanism of the eruptions. 
The causes and characteristics of the civil wars in the 1990s have been 
studied thoroughly. Such studies also provide hints to understand previ-
ous civil wars as well. Therefore, first, I show commonly shared view 
 2) The version 4-2009 is used in this article. For the detail, see the following address.  http://
www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/.
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among scholars on how civil wars in the 1990s broke out. For the purpose 
of simplication, I organize the causes into three factors; structural factor, 
long-term factor, and trigger factor. 
The structural factor
A ruling system, which were typically seen in African states, is considered 
a structural factor of the civil wars in the 1990s (cf. Chabal and Daloz 
1999; Reno 1995; Takeuchi 2007). At the time of independence, most of Af-
rican states adopted multi-party systems, but this system could not regu-
late political violence. Political oppositions esedated beyond legal frame-
works. The dysfunction of the system became apparent in the late 1960s. 
Political violence and unconstitutional regime changes (typically coups) 
had been rampant. In order to maintain political order, the rulers aban-
doned the democratic systems and adopted authoritarian rules. As the re-
sult, the number of countries of either military rule or one-party system 
increased since the late 1960s (Takeuchi 2007). 
In such autocratic rules, rulers developed non-institutionalized way to 
subjugate political actors in their hands. A ruler developed patronage poli-
tics of economic distribution. The state rulers maintained their power by 
controlling state resources in their private hand, and distribute to his sub-
ordinates. A president personally controlled the government’s economic re-
sources by diverting official revenue or by engaging in illicit economic ac-
tivities using state apparatus3). A ruler took control of the country’s 
economic resources (Reno 2012). 
In order to maintain the power, a ruler distributed material benefits to his 
subordinates. The subordinate politicians could enjoy economic benefits as 
long as they were submissive to the ruler. A ruler might appoint his subor-
dinate politicians to governmental posts that were economically beneficial. 
For example, managers of airports and ports had opportunities to benefit 
through taxing and illicit trades. Positions of the procurement section pro-
vided chances to accept kickbacks. These politicians could build their per-
 3) Reno (1995) illustrate how rulers accumulate their personal wealth in the case of Sierra 
Leone.
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sonal, commercial, and political connections while keeping oneself under 
the subordination to their president. For a ruler, to control political elites 
is to make them satisfy to be under the control (Reno 2012: 12, 166). 
However, this rule which is based on patronage and on resource distribu-
tion was fragile. In this ruling system, a person who captures a state can 
obtain state resources in their own hands. This person can manage the re-
sources belong to a state according to his personel will. This personaliza-
tion of state wealth works to intensity political struggles. Subordinates 
challenge to a ruler if they are not satisfied with being under their ruler’s 
control. As a result, unconstitutional regime changes are more likely. Thus, 
ruling system prevalent in Africa works as a structural cause of civil war 
in the 1990s. 
Long-term factor
The long-term factor is the decay of patronage rule by economic darn-turn. 
The ruling system had eroded because of economic deterioration. State 
rulers lost their resource for distribution as their countries were involved 
in economic crisis. 
The oil crisis of the 1970s is the triger of economic crisis.It fostered a re-
cession in the industrialized countries of Europe and North America. The 
recession lowered demands and prices of agricultural and mineral prod-
ucts. The African economy, which depends on exports of primary commodi-
ties, had deteriorated as the consequence. The economic deterioration un-
dermined the ability of African states to repay national debts.Rulers in 
African states sustained their rules by distributing economic benefits. Due 
to a double crisis involving exports and debt, the state rulers could no 
longer sustain resouce distribution to his subordinates. Due to the lack of 
distributing resource, the ruler lose their power to grip their subordinates 
(Cooper 2002: 88-89; cf. Reno 1998).  
The power of a state ruler was further reduced by economic reforms en-
forced by international financing institutions. African governments, 
trapped by debt default, sought help from international financial institu-
tions (such as the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World 
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Bank) for additional loans or debt rescheduling. Those institutions im-
posed economic reforms in exchange for accepting economic reform which 
is called a ‘structural adjustment program.’ In a structural adjustment 
program, radical economic reforms̶a shrinking government, removing 
economic regulation, a deregulating market etc.̶were implemented. Rad-
ical economic reforms further deteriorated the economic situation in Afri-
can states (Cooper 2002: 116). 
One misfortune followed another. The end of the Cold War made the super-
powers withdraw from providing strategic aids to African states. During 
the Cold War period, superpowers, both the West and the East, assisted Af-
rican states in fostering the Cold War alliance. Since the Cold War ended, 
they lost interest in African states. The cut-off of aid further afflicted the 
rulers of African countries.Thus, ruler gradually lose resources for sustain-
ing their patronage rule.    
Trigger factor
Economic deterioration undermined a ruler’s grip on the state. It gave the 
subordinates more chances to challenge the ruler. 
In some countries, a former subordinate organized rebel groups. Excluding 
subordinates who have relatively strong power are possible challengers for 
a ruler. Rulers after remove such subordintes from a government. Com-
mon strategies for state rulers to exclude their opponents are to make a 
charge against them of a coup plot or of enable zzlement. Those who were 
excluded from a central government challenge to a ruler by rebelling 
against the ruler. 
In some countries, the electoral process caused civil wars. Prior to the 
1990s, opposition parties had been outlawed under autocratic rule. By con-
trast, in the 1990s, competitive democracy bloomed. The international 
pressure as well as pressure from domestic movements make a goverment 
introduce multi-party system. Elections are a legal chance for political 
elites to take state resources into their own hands. Former subordinates of 
a ruler reemerge as party leaders in the process of democratization. They 
competed in election campaigns. However, the campaign escalated into a 
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conflict among groups of supporters. It further escalated to civil wars 
when the candidates provided supporters with arms (cf. Takeuchi 2007). 
Thus, escalation of political struggle among political elites are widely con-
sidered as the cause of civil wars (Allen 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; 
Reno 1998; Takeuchi 2007). Thus, the civil wars in the 1990s broke out due 
to an accumulation of several factors: political system based on patronage 
worked as structural factor. Economic deterioration since the 1970s, and 
subsequent structural adjustment programs caused reduction of resources 
in patronage systems. The end of the Cold War also reduce the amount of 
resources for rulers to distribute. Democratization, or the introduction of a 
multi-party electoral system works for igniting political competitions and 
developing into civil wars.
This pathway explains generalized path of African countries to fall into 
civil wars. Countries who fell into civil wars took more or less similar pass. 
On the other hand, countries who did not fell into civil wars could escape 
from taking the path. Bearing the path into mind, this paper examine the 
trends from 1960 to 2009.  
THE PRIO/UCDP DATASET AND THE OBSERVED TRENDS OF THE CIVIL 
WARS
Selection of a dataset 
Most studies on African civil wars concentrate on the 1990s, but some ar-
gue the trends have occurred since the 1960s (Clapham 1998; Reno 2011). 
However, previous analyses only show the major trends. They do not dis-
cuss minor trends/even though minon trends might be an important factor 
in capturing the dynamics in Africa. In order to avoid overlooking minor 
trends, this article select cases from a dataset of armed conflict. As quanti-
tative dataset is based on a clearly-measurable definition of ‘armed con-
flict,’ minor conflicts and hidden trends cannot be missed. 
Several datasets are available for armed conflict. To name a few, the data-
set of the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), Monty Marshall’s 2006 
study for the UK government, and the PRIO/UCDP armed conflict dataset 
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are popular (cf. William 2011: 16-23).
I use the PRIO/UCDP dataset because of its reliability and popularity. The 
Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) is a leading institution of peace 
research established in 1959, which owns several leading journals on 
peace studies. The PRIO/UCDP dataset was produced in collaboration 
with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). This dataset was origi-
nally published in 2002. New versions are published every year with im-
provements and refinements. I use the version 4-2009, which covers the 
period from 1946 to 2009. 
The reason I use the PRIO/UCDP dataset is not only because of its relia-
bility and popularity, but also because of its lower definition of ‘armed con-
flict.’ The definition of ‘armed conflict’ in this dataset is lower than any 
other datasets. Due to the lower threshold, capturing minor trends is also 
expected. 
Definition of ‘armed conflict’ and the data selection
This dataset defines ‘armed conflict’ as a battle-related death of a given 
year. In the PRIO/UCDP dataset, armed conflict is defined as,
a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least 
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related 
deaths. 
Readers might criticize the definition because battle-related death seens 
to be an inappropriate barometer for civil wars because civilians are also 
involved. Many indirect deaths occur as well. However, battle-related 
death is at least numerable. Civilian deaths or indirect deaths in civil 
wars are difficult to enumerate. Therefore, in most cases, the dataset relies 
on battle-related deaths in one way or another. The UCDP/PRIO dataset is 
one of those cases.  
The PRIO/UCDP dataset categorizes armed conflicts into four categories; 
namely ‘internal armed conflicts,’ ‘internationalized internal armed con-
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flict,’ ‘interstate armed conflicts’4) and ‘extrasystemic conflicts’5). The analy-
sis in this article focus on ‘internal conflict’ and ‘internationalized internal 
armed conflict’. Internal armed conflict is defined as an armed conflict 
which “occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal 
opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.”, and interna-
tionalized internal armed conflict is defined as an armed conflict which 
“occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal oppo-
sition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on 
one or both sides.” (UCDP/PRIO 2009). I call the two types of armed con-
flicts ‘civil wars’ hereafter. I pick up “civil wars” observed in sub-Saharan 
Africa from the dataset which covers whole of the world. 
How to deal with the definition
The quantitative definition needs careful attention. First, it might include 
violence, which is normally not considered armed conflict. For example, an 
escalated coup that develops into exchange of fire, or skirmishes between 
governmental forces and unknown armed groups also fits the definition. 
At the same time, it might not include violence, which is generally consid-
ered an armed conflict. The Rwandan Genocide is not included in the data-
set, because it is not “contested incompatibility...between two parties” 
(UCDP/PRIO 2009).  
  
Second, whether a given year is in armed conflict or not is defined by the 
number of deaths. The year with less than 25 battle-related deaths is not 
counted as the period of armed conflict. Even in the period that a country’s 
territory was divided by several armed factions, any year that saw less 
than 25 battle-related deaths is not a period of armed conflict. For exam-
ple, the first Liberian civil war historically began in 1989 and ended in 
1996; but, in the UCDP/PRIO database, only 1989 and 1990 are included 
in the periods of armed conflict. Liberia was divided by several armed fac-
tions by 1996, but in the period of 1991 to 1996, the battle-related deaths 
do not exceed 25. As a result, this period is not counted as a period of 
armed conflict. Thus, the period of armed conflicts is often different from 
 4) Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states.
 5) Extrasystemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own 
territory. Majority of extrasystemic armed conflicts are colonial conflicts.
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what is recognized in case studies. 
Overall trend of African ‘civil wars’
Keeping in mind the argument so far, I show data from the UCDP/PRIO 
dataset. Figure 1 shows the number of countries involved in civil wars in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The number of civil wars increased since 1985. This 
increase would support the previous studies which point out the escalation 
of armed conflict in the 1990s (Allen 1999; Takeuchi 2007). 
This graph shows civil wars with more than 25 battle-related deaths. In 
order to look at the trend of civil wars in higher intensity, Figure 2 shows 
the number of civil wars that have more than 1000 battle-related deaths.
Figure 1:  Number of countries with civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa 
(1960 to 2009)
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Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2009
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Judging from battle-related deaths, civil wars with higher intensity con-
centrated from the late 1970s to the 1980s. It is prone to decrease during 
the 1990s. It shows that number of civil wars increased in the 1990s, but 
they were not necessarily more intense than previous wars. 
Qualitative analysis of the UCDP/PRIO dataset
Then, what trends are hidden behind the overall trend of the African civil 
wars? In order to uncover trends of the African civil wars hidden within 
the overall trends, this section analyzes the cases of civil wars in the 
UCDP/PRIO dataset. 
I analyze trends with country-basis. I examine trajectories of every civil 
war (cases in the categories of ‘internal armed conflict’ and ‘international-
ized internal conflict’), then, sort countries out based on the characteristics 
Figure 2:  Number of countries with civil wars with more than 1000 battle-
related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa (1960 to 2009)
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of civil wars. Some countries fit into more than two categories. In these 
cases, I pair the country with the category that best fits the country. 
Five trends of the civil wars 
The categorization of the civil wars in Africa from 1960 to 2009 is shown in 
Figure 3. The graphs in Figure 3 show the experience of civil wars in each 
African country. I categorized the countries into five trends. Two countries 
(Nigeria and Angola) are left as exceptions. I cannot categorize the two 
countries into any trends. The points ( ◍ ) show the year of independence. 
(Category. 1) Countries of chronic civil wars 
Category 1 represents ‘countries of chronic civil wars.’ The countries in 
this category, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Chad, have been involved in civil wars 
consistently since the 1960s. These countries could not establish the rule 
of the central government since their independences up to the present day. 
In these countries, civil wars are still remained in the late 2000s6). 
(Category. 2) Countries of the Cold-War induced civil wars
Category 2 represents ‘countries of Cold-War induced civil wars.’ Mozam-
bique and South Africa fit into that category. In these countries, civil wars 
were fueled by the Cold War structure. The civil wars are sustained be-
cause of military assistance from both the East and the West. In these 
countries, civil wars ended along with the end of the Cold War.  
(Category. 3) Coups in the 1980s
Category 3 represents ‘coups in the 1980s.’ Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gam-
bia, Ghana, Kenya, and Togo are in that category. These ‘civil wars’ are not 
civil wars in the traditional sense; they are coups. These coups are regard-
ed as ‘internal conflicts’ in the definition of the UCDP/PRIO dataset. Most 
of these civil wars are short in duration. 
 6) Independence of South Sudan is in 2011, which is not in the realm of analysis in this arti-
cle.
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(Category. 4) Civil wars in chain reactions 
Thirteen countries make up category 4. In these countries, civil wars broke 
out in sequence due to the influence from neighboring countries. ‘Chain re-
actions’ of civil wars have been observed in these countries. This trend be-
gan in the 1970s, but accelerated in the 1990s. I name this category ‘Civil 
wars in chain reactions.’ The thirteen countries that are a part of this cate-
gory are Burundi, Central Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia and Uganda. 
(Category. 5) Stand-alone civil wars
The last category, category 5 is ‘stand-alone civil wars.’ The countries in 
this group experience civil wars in the 1990s. Different from category 4, 
the civil wars in these countries did not have strong relation with neigh-
boring countries. In these countries, internal causes are stronger than 
neighboring factors. However, these countries are not completely free from 
influence of neighboring countries. Some influence might be there. At 
least, in these countries, influence from neighbors is not direct cause of the 
civil wars. These countries do not trigger neighboring civil wars either. Co-
moro is an island country, while the others (Guinea Bissau, Congo [Braza-
ville], Djibouti, Lesotho and Senegal) are located in the African continent. 
Figure 3: Five trends of the civil wars
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(EXCEPTIONS)
I cannot categorize Angola and Nigeria. Angola is mix of category 2 (group 
of Cold- War induced civil wars) and category 5 (stand-alone civil wars). 
The civil war in Angola, which is the continuation of colonial war, lasts be-
cause of the Cold War structure. Neighboring countries and the superpow-
ers provide military assistance to the warring actors. After the end of the 
Cold War, an Angolan rebel group (the National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola: UNITA) sustained themselves by profiting from min-
ing diamonds in their territory. Military aid stopped when the Cold War 
ended, but the UNITA survived by funding themselves. Nigeria does not 
fit into any of the categories.   
Relations among the five trends
These five trends are observed in Africa since the 1960s. Then, how are 
these five trends interrelated? Figure 6 shows the trends of civil wars in a 
glance. 
Most of the African countries have achieved independence in 1960. In the 
(Figure 3 continues...)
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㻰㻾㻌㻯㼛㼚㼓㼛
㻾㼣㼍㼚㼐㼍
㻱㼞㼕㼠㼞㼑㼍
㻺㼕㼓㼑㼞
㻯㼑㼚㼠㼞㼍㼘㻌㻭㼒㼞㼕㼏㼍
㻯㼛㼠㼑㻌㼐㻓㻵㼢㼛㼕㼞㼑
㻳㼡㼕㼚㼑㼍
㻸㼕㼎㼑㼞㼕㼍
㼁㼓㼍㼚㼐㼍
㻿㼛㼙㼍㼘㼕㼍
㻿㼕㼑㼞㼞㼍㻌㻸㼑㼛㼚㼑
Few civil wars from the 1960s to the 1980s 
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early and mid-1960s, several civil wars broke out. These civil wars erupted 
because the newly established governments could not control domestic ac-
tors. Some countries experienced short-term civil wars (these wars are 
shown in the encircled part of Figure 6) (Cameroon, Congo, DRC and Nige-
ria). Majortly of countries settled the wars. On the other hand, some coun-
tries have not been able to control their own territory until present. By 
these countries (Chad, Ethiopia and Sudan), Category 1 is consisted. 
Regardless of initial reasons, several countries were kept involved in civil 
wars because of the Cold War structure. These countries consisted Catego-
ry 2. In South Africa, oppositions against the white minority rule devel-
oped into a civil war. South Africa was one of strong allies of the West, 
which attempted to avoid communization of the neighboring countries. 
The white minority rule was condoned in the logic of the Cold War. 
Countries of Lusophone Africa achieved independences came in 1975 after 
the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon. The Angolan independent war turned 
into a civil war due to the independence in 1975. Several anti-colonial fac-
tions struggled for the central government at the time of the independ-
ence. Mozambique once achieved independence but soon fell into a civil 
Figure 4: The five trends of the civil wars
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war which prolonged by military assistances to warring factions by the 
East and by the West (Category 2 and Angola). These civil wars were re-
solved at the time that the Cold War ended. 
Economic deterioration since the late 1970s undermined the control of the 
rules of states. That led to civil wars through two manners. Categories of 3 
to 5 are in one or the other. 
First manner is that weakened territorial control allowed anti-governmen-
tal groups to rebel. These groups were supported by neighboring countries 
or used the neighboring countries as rear bases. Uganda, which shares 
border with Sudan, fell into a civil war in the late 1970s. Then, in the early 
1980s, a civil war broke out in Somalia also. Neighboring Ethiopia had re-
lated to the civil war. These countries have been in the state of civil wars 
until the present. These countries ignited further chain reactions in the 
1990s (Category 4). 
The other manner become evident around 1980s (Category 3). The eco-
nomic crisis since the late 1970s ignited coups in some countries. Starting 
from Liberia, several countries experienced coups. Burkina Faso, Came-
roon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya and Togo are examples. Except for Liberia, 
these countries had not experienced civil wars afterwards. It might be be-
cause the coups worked as chances to reform the countries (Liberia is cate-
gorized in Category 4 because of subsequent civil wars). 
   
Since around 1990s, civil wars became rampant. Previous studies shows 
that economic deteriorations since the 1970s are long-term factor of these 
civil wars. Some civil wars in the 1990s lasted longer (Category 4), while 
the others (Category 5) are shorter. 
The difference was made by influence from neighbors. In the countries of 
Category 5, fewer influence from neighboring countries on outbreaks of 
the civil wars. The civil wars in category 5 were not influenced by neigh-
bors. On the other hand, in the contries of category 4, neighboring influ-
ence are strong. Countries in Category 4 imported civil wars from adjacent 
countries that had been already in civil wars. Once a civil war was import-
ed, the country exported civil wars to the other neighbors. Such chain re-
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actions began in countries of Category 1, spread to Uganda and Somalia in 
the 1970s and the 1980s, then, spread further to the other countries dur-
ing the 1990s.        
The comparison between Category 4 and 5 shows that civil wars with 
cross-border influence (Category 4) tend to prolong more than separately 
induced civil wars (Category 5). According to Figure 4, only civil wars in 
Category 1 and Category 4 (Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Uganda, Somalia, 
Rwanda, Central Africa and Mali) are  left in 2009. Civil wars in the other 
categories (Category 2, 3, and 5) had winded down.
CIVIL WARS IN THE 1990S: ZONE OF CHAIN REACTIONS  
Civil wars in the 1990s are either prolonged civil wars (Category 1) or 
newly erupted civil wars (Category 4 except for Uganda and Somalia and 
Category 5). As Category 4 except for Somalia and Uganda, and Category 
5 shows, new civil wars in the 1990s broke out in countries which rarely 
experienced civil wars previously. It was visually shown by the empty 
space in Figure 5 that lies the period from the 1960s to the 1980s of Cate-
gory 4 and 5, which is encircled by dotted lines (……)(Somalia and Uganda 
are exceptions). 
The number of countries in Category 4 is more than in Category 5. That 
means that civil wars were more likely to break out with influence from 
neighbors. Civil wars of both categories have domestic causes, but coun-
tries in Category 4 were intensified by neighbors, while ones in Category 5 
were not (if any, few). 
‘Chain reactions’ can be observed in Category 4 in which a civil war in a 
country affected to eruptions at another civil war in neighboring countries. 
In majority of case, the chain reactions began from countries of Category 
1. Figure 7 shows geographical mapping of the chain reactions. The chain 
reactions were concentrated into four zones. I call them, ‘Zones of Chain 
Reaction.’ 
In three among four zones, the chain reactions started from countries of 
Category 1. Countries of Category 1 have experienced civil wars chronical-
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ly. These wars fostered civil wars of neighboring countries, when these 
countries lose their grip to their territories. 
 
The first zone is Horn of Africa. This zone was formed since the 1980s. The 
countries in this zone are Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia. The mutual influ-
ence among these countries made civil wars prolong (cf. Reno, 2012: 123). 
Sudan and Ethiopia are in Category 1. 
The second zone is Great Lakes Region, which includes Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi and DRC. In this zone, the chain reaction started from Sudan. 
Figure 5: Geographical mapping of zones in the chain reaction of civil wars
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Then, it spread to Uganda in the late 1970s. Then, Uganda exported a civil 
war to Rwanda by assisting the Rwandan rebel, the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF). The Rwandan instability introduced by the RPF triggered 
the Rwandan Genocide, as well as civil wars in neighboring Burundi and 
DRC. Then, Eastern region of DRC emerged as a hub of chain reactions 
which ‘import’ and ‘export’ civil wars from/to neighboring countries since 
the late 1990s. The areas around Eastern region of the DRC have been in-
stable up to now. 
The third zone is the Chad Basin in which Sudan, Chad, Niger, Central Af-
rica, and Mali are located. This zone does not have a hub. This zone is a se-
quence of several dyadic relations: one country affects another country. 
This zone has been active since the early 2000s. Chad (a country of Cate-
gory 1) experienced chronic civil wars since the independence. In the 
2000s, Darfur war began. Since then, this zone has become more destabi-
lized. 
The fourth zone is the Gulf of Guinea. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and 
Cote d’ Ivoire are included. This zone is not related to Category 1. The 
destabilization of this zone started from Liberia. Liberia experienced a 
coup in 1980, but is different from other countries which experienced 
coups in the 1980s (Category 3). Countries of Category 3 had not experi-
enced civil wars in the 1990s. On the other hand, Liberia was involved in 
civil war again in the 1990s. This is because the military regime of Samuel 
Doe, which established by the coup in 1980, could not stabilize Liberia. 
Doe regime further destabilized the country and that led to a new civil 
war. The head of a rebel leader, Charles Taylor, who ignited the first Libe-
rian civil war, was a former cabinet member of the military regime. Thus, 
countries of Category 4 are geographically concentrated in four zones. 
CONCLUSION 
This article attempts to capture the longer trends of the African civil wars 
from the 1960s to 2009. This article categorizes the civil wars in sub-Saha-
ran Africa from 1960 to 2009 into five trends, and discusses each trend 
and how they relate each other. In conclusion, I can point out four findings. 
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First, the increase of civil wars in the 1990s was more acute than ever 
thought. This article finds that the majority of civil wars in the decade are 
new ones (Category 4 and 5), while some of wars are existing since the 
1960s (Category 1). The new wars broke out in countries that have experi-
enced few civil wars before. However, the acute increase in the 1990s was 
obscured on the Figure 1 because other civil wars ended in the 1980s. 
Countries in Category 2 experienced the Cold War induced civil wars 
which had ended before 1990. This means that the civil wars were re-
placed around 1990 which is clearly observed in the Figure 4. Therefore, I 
can conclude that a lot of new civil wars broke out in the 1990s. 
Second, a prior phenomenon of the civil wars in the 1990s was observed in 
the 1980s. In the 1980s, several countries experienced coups (Category 3 
and Liberia). These coups broke out because of economic deterioration 
since the late 1970s. However, most of these countries succeeded to stabi-
lize countries (Liberia is exception). The countries in which coups broke 
out in the 1980s had chances of economic and political reforms before the 
situation worsened further. On the other hand, countries that had not ex-
perienced coups fell into civil wars in the 1990s. 
Third, the majority of the new civil wars in the 1990s broke out as a result 
of cross-border expansions from neighboring countries. The expansions 
originated from the countries which chronically experience civil wars (Cat-
egory 1). The cross-border expansions started from the countries and 
spread to other countries.
At last, I point out problems of this article. First, the analysis in this arti-
cle is on the basis of country. Some country experienced more than two civ-
il wars in a same period. For example, Ethiopia and Sudan experienced 
several conflicts in a given period. This article does not analyze these do-
mestic dynamics. Second, this article does not analyze new trend of vio-
lence in the 2000s. Since the late 2000s, in Kenya and Sudan, inter-com-
munal conflicts have broken out. Such conflicts are not included in UCDP/
PRIO database, because they are not in the definition of armed conflict. 
While governments should be involved in armed conflict in the definition, 
governments are not involved in the inter-communal conflicts. These con-
flicts are not armed conflicts by the UCDP/PRIO’s definition. Such new 
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conflicts should be analyzed using a different methodology. 
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